AUGUSTINIAN VIRTUE AC:

*Love is when the other person's happiness is more important than your own.*

FRAMEWORK:

**I value morality.** Ethics focuses on actions, but one must first provide a proper orientation to the good. Our passions are not arbitrary, but can be merited by the objective. Two warrants. **C.S. LEWIS**[[1]](#footnote-1): Until quite modern times all teachers and even all men believed the universe to be such that certain emotional reactions on our part could be either congruous or incongruous to it—believed, in fact, that objects did not merely receive, but could merit, our approval or disapproval, our reverence or our contempt. The reason why Coleridge agreed with the tourist who called the cataract sublime and disagreed with the one who called it pretty was of course that he believed inanimate nature to be such that certain responses could be more 'just' or 'ordinate' or 'appropriate' to it than others. And he believed (correctly) that the tourists thought the same. The man who called the cataract sublime was not intending simply to describe his own emotions about it: he was also claiming that the object was one which merited those emotions. But for this claim there would be nothing to agree or disagree about. To disagree with This is pretty if those words simply described the lady's feelings, would be absurd: if she had said I feel sick Coleridge would hardly have replied No; I feel quite well. When Shelley, having compared the human sensibility to an Aeolian lyre, goes on to add that it differs from a lyre in having a power of 'internal adjustment' whereby it can 'accommodate its chords to the motions of that which strikes them',9 he is assuming the same belief. 'Can you be righteous', asks Traherne, 'unless you be just in rendering to things their due esteem? All things were made to be yours and you were made to prize them according to their value.'10 St Augustine defines virtue as ordo amoris, the ordinate condition of the affections in which every object is accorded that kind of degree of love which is appropriate to it.11 Aristotle says that the aim of education is to make the pupil like and dislike what he ought.12 When the age for reflective thought comes, the pupil who has been thus trained in 'ordinate affections' or 'just sentiments' will easily find the first principles in Ethics; but to the corrupt man they will never be visible at all and he can make no progress in that science.13 Plato before him had said the same. The little human animal will not at first have the right responses. It must be trained to feel pleasure, liking, disgust, and hatred at those things which really are pleasant, likeable, disgusting and hateful.14 In the Republic, the well-nurtured youth is one 'who would see most clearly whatever was amiss in ill-made works of man or illgrown works of nature, and with a just distaste would blame and hate the ugly even from his earliest years and would give delighted praise to beauty, receiving it into his soul and being nourished by it, so that he becomes a man of gentle heart. All this before he is of an age to reason; so that when Reason at length comes to him, then, bred as he has been, he will hold out his hands in welcome and recognize her because of the affinity he bears to her.'15 In early Hinduism that conduct in men which can be called good consists in conformity to, or almost participation in, the Rta—that great ritual or pattern of nature and supernature which is revealed alike in the cosmic order, the moral virtues, and the ceremonial of the temple. Righteousness, correctness, order, the Rta, is constantly identified with satya or truth, correspondence to reality. As Plato said that the Good was 'beyond existence' and Wordsworth that through virtue the stars were strong, so the Indian masters say that the gods themselves are born of the Rta and obey it.16 The Chinese also speak of a great thing (the greatest thing) called the Tao. It is the reality beyond all predicates, the abyss that was before the Creator Himself. It is Nature, it is the Way, the Road. It is the Way in which the universe goes on, the Way in which things everlastingly emerge, stilly and tranquilly, into space and time. It is also the Way which every man should tread in imitation of that cosmic and supercosmic progression, conforming all activities to that great exemplar.17 'In ritual', say the Analects, 'it is harmony with Nature that is prized.'18 The ancient Jews likewise praise the Law as being 'true'.19 This conception in all its forms, Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Christian, and Oriental alike, I shall henceforth refer to for brevity simply as 'the Tao'. Some of the accounts of it which I have quoted will seem, perhaps, to many of you merely quaint or even magical. But what is common to them all is something we cannot neglect. It is the doctrine of objective value, the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of thing the universe is and the kind of things we are. Those who know the Tao can hold that to call children delightful or old men venerable is not simply to record a psychological fact about our own parental or filial emotions at the moment, but to recognize a quality which demands a certain response from us whether we make it or not. I myself do not enjoy the society of small children: because I speak from within the Tao I recognize this as a defect in myself—just as a man may have to recognize that he is tone deaf or colour blind. And because our approvals and disapprovals are thus recognitions of objective value or responses to an objective order, therefore emotional states can be in harmony with reason (when we feel liking for what ought to be approved) or out of harmony with reason (when we perceive that liking is due but cannot feel it). No emotion is, in itself, a judgement; in that sense all emotions and sentiments are alogical. But they can be reasonable or unreasonable as they conform to Reason or fail to conform. The heart never takes the place of the head: but it can, and should, obey it. Over against this stands the world of The Green Book. In it the very possibility of a sentiment being reasonable—or even unreasonable—has been excluded from the outset. It can be reasonable or unreasonable only if it conforms or fails to conform to something else. To say that the cataract is sublime means saying that our emotion of humility is appropriate or ordinate to the reality, and thus to speak of something else besides the emotion; just as to say that a shoe fits is to speak not only of shoes but of feet. But this reference to something beyond the emotion is what Gaius and Titius exclude from every sentence containing a predicate of value. Such statements, for them, refer solely to the emotion. Now the emotion, thus considered by itself, cannot be either in agreement or disagreement with Reason. It is irrational not as a paralogism is irrational, but as a physical event is irrational: it does not rise even to the dignity of error. On this view, the world of facts, without one trace of value, and the world of feelings, without one trace of truth or falsehood, justice or injustice, confront one another, and no rapprochement is possible. Hence the educational problem is wholly different according as you stand within or without the Tao. For those within, the task is to train in the pupil those responses which are in themselves appropriate, whether anyone is making them or not, and in making which the very nature of man consists. Those without, if they are logical, must regard all sentiments as equally non-rational, as mere mists between us and the real objects. As a result, they must either decide to remove all sentiments, as far as possible, from the pupil's mind; or else to encourage some sentiments for reasons that have nothing to do with their intrinsic 'justness' or 'ordinacy'. The latter course involves them in the questionable process of creating in others by 'suggestion' or incantation a mirage which their own reason has successfully dissipated. Perhaps this will become clearer if we take a concrete instance. When a Roman father told his son that it was a sweet and seemly thing to die for his country, he believed what he said. He was communicating to the son an emotion which he himself shared and which he believed to be in accord with the value which his judgement discerned in noble death. He was giving the boy the best he had, giving of his spirit to humanize him as he had given of his body to beget him. But Gaius and Titius cannot believe that in calling such a death sweet and seemly they would be saying 'something important about something'. Their own method of debunking would cry out against them if they attempted to do so. For death is not something to eat and therefore cannot be dulce in the literal sense, and it is unlikely that the real sensations preceding it will be dulce even by analogy. And as for decorum—that is only a word describing how some other people will feel about your death when they happen to think of it, which won't be often, and will certainly do you no good. There are only two courses open to Gaius and Titius. Either they must go the whole way and debunk this sentiment like any other, or must set themselves to work to produce, from outside, a sentiment which they believe to be of no value to the pupil and which may cost him his life, because it is useful to us (the survivors) that our young men should feel it. If they embark on this course the difference between the old and the new education will be an important one. Where the old initiated, the new merely 'conditions'. The old dealt with its pupils as grown birds deal with young birds when they teach them to fly; the new deals with them more as the poultry-keeper deals with young birds— making them thus or thus for purposes of which the birds know nothing. In a word, the old was a kind of propagation—men transmitting manhood to men; the new is merely propaganda. It is to their credit that Gaius and Titius embrace the first alternative. Propaganda is their abomination: not because their own philosophy gives a ground for condemning it (or anything else) but because they are better than their principles. They probably have some vague notion (I will examine it in my next lecture) that valour and good faith and justice could be sufficiently commended to the pupil on what they would call 'rational' or 'biological' or 'modern' grounds, if it should ever become necessary. In the meantime, they leave the matter alone and get on with the business of debunking. But this course, though less inhuman, is not less disastrous than the opposite alternative of cynical propaganda. Let us suppose for a moment that the harder virtues could really be theoretically justified with no appeal to objective value. It still remains true that no justification of virtue will enable a [person] man to be virtuous. Without the aid of trained emotions the intellect is powerless against the animal organism. I had sooner play cards against a man who was quite sceptical about ethics, but bred to believe that 'a gentleman does not cheat', than against an irreproachable moral philosopher who had been brought up among sharpers. In battle it is not syllogisms that will keep the reluctant nerves and muscles to their post in the third hour of the bombardment. The crudest sentimentalism (such as Gaius and Titius would wince at) about a flag or a country or a regiment will be of more use. We were told it all long ago by Plato. As the king governs by his executive, so Reason in man must rule the mere appetites by means of the 'spirited element'.20 The head rules the belly through the chest— the seat, as Alanus tells us, of Magnanimity,21 of emotions organized by trained habit into stable sentiments. The Chest-Magnanimity-Sentiment—these are the indispensable liaison officers between cerebral man and visceral man. It may even be said that it is by this middle element that man is man: for by his intellect he is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal. The operation of The Green Book and its kind is to produce what may be called Men without Chests. It is an outrage that they should be commonly spoken of as Intellectuals. This gives them the chance to say that he who attacks them attacks Intelligence. It is not so. They are not distinguished from other men by any unusual skill in finding truth nor any virginal ardour to pursue her. Indeed it would be strange if they were: a persevering devotion to truth, a nice sense of intellectual honour, cannot be long maintained without the aid of a sentiment which Gaius and Titius could debunk as easily as any other. It is not excess of thought but defect of fertile and generous emotion that marks them out. Their heads are no bigger than the ordinary: it is the atrophy of the chest beneath that makes them seem so.

**And**, theories that do not account for ‘being for’ things deflate moral considerations. They wrench action out of its larger ethical context; only a virtue orientation can account for the continuity and diversity of ethics. The standard is **consistency with the Ordo Amoris,** or action following from a correct orientation of passions towards their objects.

First, every object with which we interact seems to some good. Even pain helps us to move around safely in the world. The only way to morally distinguish between ends is through the proper degrees of love. AUGUSTINE**[[2]](#footnote-2)**: We need not at present give a careful and copious exposition of the doctrine of Scripture, the sum of Christian knowledge, regarding these passions. It subjects the mind itself to God, that He may rule and aid it, and the passions, again, to the mind, to moderate and bridle them, and turn them to righteous uses. In our ethics, we do not so much inquire whether a pious soul is angry, as why [s]he is angry; not whether [s]he is sad, but what is the cause of his sadness; not whether he fears, but what [s]he fears. For I am not aware that any right thinking person would find fault with anger at a wrongdoer which seeks his amendment, or with sadness which intends relief to the suffering, or with fear lest one in danger be destroyed. The Stoics, indeed, are accustomed to condemn compassion. [Seneca, De Clem. ii. 4 and 5.] But how much more honourable had it been in that Stoic we have been telling of, had he been disturbed by compassion prompting him to relieve a fellow-creature, than to be disturbed by the fear of shipwreck! Far better, and more humane, and more consonant with pious sentiments, are the words of Cicero in praise of Cæsar, when he says, “Among your virtues none is more admirable and agreeable than your compassion.” [Pro. Lig. c. 12.] And what is compassion but a fellow-feeling for another’s misery, which prompts us to help him if we can? And this emotion is obedient to reason, when compassion is shown without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven. Cicero, who knew how to use language, did not hesitate to call this a virtue, which the Stoics are not ashamed to reckon among the vices, although, as the book of thatBottom of Form eminent Stoic, Epictetus, quoting the opinions of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the school, has taught us, they admit that passions of this kind invade the soul of the wise man, whom they would have to be free from all vice. Whence it follows that these very passions are not judged by them to be vices, since they assail the wise man without forcing him to act against reason and virtue; and that, therefore, the opinion of the Peripatetics or Platonists and of the Stoics is one and the same. But, as Cicero says, [De Oratore, i. 11, 47.] mere logomachy is the bane of these pitiful Greeks, who thirst for contention rather than for truth. However, it may justly be asked, whether our subjection to these affections, even while we follow virtue, is a part of the infirmity of this life? For the holy angels feel no anger while they punish those whom the eternal law of God consigns to punishment, no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the miserable, no fear while they aid those who are in danger; and yet ordinary language ascribes to them also these mental emotions, because, though they have none of our weakness, their acts resemble the actions to which these emotions move us; and thus even God Himself is said in Scripture to be angry, and yet without any perturbation. For this word is used of the effect of His vengeance, not of the disturbing mental affection. [He Continues] When the human race, in the exercise of this freedom of will, increased and advanced, there arose a mixture and confusion of the two cities by their participation in a common iniquity. And this calamity, as well as the first, was occasioned by woman, though not in the same way; for these women were not themselves betrayed, neither did they persuade the men to sin, but having belonged to the earthly city and society of the earthly, they had been of corrupt manners from the first, and were loved for their bodily beauty by the sons of God, or the citizens of the other city which sojourns in this world. Beauty is indeed a good gift of God; but that the good may not think it a great good, God dispenses it even to the wicked. And thus, when the good that is great and proper to the good was abandoned by the sons of God, they fell to a paltry good which is not peculiar to the good, but common to the good and the evil; and when they were captivated by the daughters of men, they adopted the manners of the earthly to win them as their brides, and forsook the godly ways they had followed in their own holy society. And thus beauty, which is indeed God’s handiwork, but only a temporal, carnal, and lower kind of good, is not fitly loved in preference to God, the eternal, spiritual, and unchangeable good. When the miser prefers his gold to justice, it is through no fault of the gold, but of the [miser]man; and so with every created thing. For though it be good, it may be loved with an evil as well as with a good love: it is loved rightly when it is loved ordinately; evilly, when inordinately. It is this which some one has briefly said in these verses in praise of the Creator: [Or, according to another reading, “Which I briefly said in these verses in praise of a taper.”] “These are Thine, they are good, because Thou art good who didst create them. There is in them nothing of ours, unless the sin we commit when we forget the order of things, and instead of Thee love that which Thou hast made.” But if the Creator is truly loved, that is, if He Himself is loved and not another thing in His stead, He cannot be evilly loved; for love itself is to be ordinately loved, because we do well to love that which, when we love it, makes us live well and virtuously. So that it seems to me that it is a brief but true definition of virtue to say, it is the order of love; and on this account, in the Canticles, the bride of Christ, the city of God, sings, “Order love within me.” [Cant. ii. 4.] It was the order of this love, then, this charity or attachment, which the sons of God disturbed when they forsook God, and were enamoured of the daughters of men. [See De Doct. Christ. i. 28.] And by these two names (sons of God and daughters of men) the two cities are sufficiently distinguished. For though the former were by nature children of men, they had come into possession of another name by grace. For in the same Scripture in which the sons of God are said to have loved the daughters of men, they are also called angels of God; whence many suppose that they were not men but angels.

Mere sentiments lack moral content until properly disposed. I can be take pleasure in destruction or creation, suffering or happiness. It cannot be pleasure that is good, but the disposition to take pleasure in proper thing.

**Second,** it is only through the basic authority of things meriting proper emotive reactions that imperative content can be supplied. Any other inference is arbitrary or commits naturalistic fallacy. **LEWIS (2)[[3]](#footnote-3):** However subjective they may be about some traditional values, Gaius and Titius have shown by the very act of writing The Green Book that there must be some other values about which they are not subjective at all. They write in order to produce certain states of mind in the rising generation, if not because they think those states of mind intrinsically just or good, yet certainly because they think them to be the means to some state of society which they regard as desirable. It would not be difficult to collect from various passages in The Green Book what their ideal is. But we need not. The important point is not the precise nature of their end, but the fact that they have an end at all. They must have, or their book (being purely practical in intention) is written to no purpose. And this end must have real value in their eyes. To abstain from calling it good and to use, instead, such predicates as 'necessary' or 'progressive' or 'efficient' would be a subterfuge. They could be forced by argument to answer the questions 'necessary for what?', 'progressing towards what?', 'effecting what?'; in the last resort they would have to admit that some state of affairs was in their opinion good for its own sake. And this time they could not maintain that 'good' simply described their own emotion about it. For the whole purpose of their book is so to condition theyoung reader that he will share their approval, and this would be either a fool's or a villain's undertaking unless they held that their approval was in some way valid or correct. In actual fact Gaius and Titius will be found to hold, with complete uncritical dogmatism, the whole system of values which happened to be in vogue among moderately educated young men of the professional classes during the period between the two wars.1 Their scepticism about values is on the surface: it is for use on other people's values; about the values current in their own set they are not nearly sceptical enough. And this phenomenon is very usual. A great many of those who 'debunk' traditional or (as they would say) 'sentimental' values have in the background values of their own which they believe to be immune from the debunking process. They claim to be cutting away the parasitic growth of emotion, religious sanction, and inherited taboos, in order that 'real' or 'basic' values may emerge. I will now try to find out what happens if this is seriously attempted. Let us continue to use the previous example—that of death for a good cause—not, of course, because virtue is the only value or martyrdom the only virtue, but because this is the experimentum crucis which shows different systems of thought in the clearest light. Let us suppose that an Innovator in values regards dulce et decorum and greater love hath no man as mere irrational sentiments which are to be stripped off in order that we may get down to the 'realistic' or 'basic' ground of this value. Where will he find such a ground? First of all, he might say that the real value lay in the utility of such sacrifice to the community. 'Good', he might say, 'means what is useful to the community.' But of course the death of the community is not useful to the community—only the death of some of its members. What is really meant is that the death of some men is useful to other men. That is very true. But on what ground are some men being asked to die for the benefit of others? Every appeal to pride, honour, shame, or love is excluded by hypothesis. To use these would be to return to sentiment and the Innovator's task is, having cut all that away, to explain to men, in terms of pure reasoning, why they will be well advised to die that others may live. He may say 'Unless some of us risk death all of us are certain to die.' But that will be true only in a limited number of cases; and even when it is true it provokes the very reasonable counter question 'Why should I be one of those who take the risk?' At this point the Innovator may ask why, after all, selfishness should be more 'rational' or 'intelligent' than altruism. The question is welcome. If by Reason we mean the process actually employed by Gaius and Titius when engaged in debunking (that is, the connecting by inference of propositions, ultimately derived from sense data, with further propositions), then the answer must be that a refusal to sacrifice oneself is no more rational than a consent to do so. And no less rational. Neither choice is rational—or irrational—at all. From propositions about fact alone no practical conclusion can ever be drawn. This will preserve society cannot lead to do this except by the mediation of society ought to be preserved. This will cost you your life cannot lead directly to do not do this: it can lead to it only through a felt desire or an acknowledged duty of self-preservation. The Innovator is trying to get a conclusion in the imperative mood out of premisses in the indicative mood: and though he continues trying to all eternity he cannot succeed, for the thing is impossible. We must therefore either extend the word Reason to include what our ancestors called Practical Reason and confess that judgements such as society ought to be preserved (though they can support themselves by no reason of the sort that Gaius and Titius demand) are not mere sentiments but are rationality itself; or else we must give up at once, and for ever, the attempt to find a core of 'rational' value behind all the sentiments we have debunked. The Innovator will not take the first alternative, for practical principles known to all men by Reason are simply the Tao which he has set out to supersede. He is more likely to give up the quest for a 'rational' core and to hunt for some other ground even more 'basic' and 'realistic'.

**Third,** the passions are the descriptive backdrop by which moral content is developed. My framework is most real world – we are raised on virtues; nobody teaches their kids deontology, but they teach them simple virtues like being honest and respectful. Other theories can’t account for how we learn. **PLATO[[4]](#footnote-4):** What I state is this,—that in children the first childish sensations are pleasure and pain, and that it is in these first that goodness and badness come to the soul; but as to wisdom and settled true opinions, a [person] man is lucky if they come to him even in old age and; [s]he that is possessed of these blessings, and all that they comprise, [653b] is indeed a perfect man. I term, then, the goodness that first comes to children “education.” When pleasure and love, and pain and hatred, spring up rightly in the souls of those who are unable as yet to grasp a rational account; and when, after grasping the rational account, they consent thereunto that they have been rightly trained in fitting practices:—this consent, viewed as a whole, is goodness, while the part of it that is rightly trained in respect of pleasures and pains, so as to hate what ought to be hated, right from the beginning [653c] up to the very end, and to love what ought to be loved, if you were to mark this part off in your definition and call it “education,” you would be giving it, in my opinion, its right name.

NEXT IS THE CONTENTION:

**First,** a living wage is critical to provide workers with self-respect. **ROGERS[[5]](#footnote-5):** Wage Rates and Self-Respect.—Wages matter to our self-respect. This point is straightforward, even commonsensical. As the Nobel Laureate economist Robert Solow wrote in an influential study, “Wage rates and jobs are not exactly like other prices and quantities. They are much more deeply involved in the way people see themselves, think about their social status, and evaluate whether they are getting a fair shake out of society.”153 Wages are, of course, a primary means through which individuals meet their material needs. But the relationship between wages and respect runs deeper than resources per se since money is a dominant primary good in our society, one “readily converted into prestige and power.”154 Wages measure the value of our work, and signify our place within the class and status structure.155 At one extreme, societies have long dealt with the worst sorts of hard and dirty work by assigning it to “degraded people,” ranging from slaves, to “‘inside’ aliens like the Indian untouchables,” to racial minorities, and, of course, to women, all of whom have been understood not to deserve decent wages, or even any wages at all.156 Given the all-too-recent historical context of slavery and serfdom, the very payment of wages is a powerful indication of workers’ moral equality. Outside such extreme examples, low-wage employment is often painful, involving “violence—to the spirit as well as to the body.”157 While not all workers risk physical injury, most still must submit to their employer’s unilateral direction, often in jobs that carry little creativity and little hope of advancement. Minimum wage laws compensate workers, however partially, for the difficulties and indignities of such work. Granted, money is an imperfect compensation for nonpecuniary harms, but it is important nevertheless. Higher wages enable workers to enjoy a higher material standard of living and perhaps to work less and spend more time on leisure. They also give tangible form to the moral equality between workers and employers. Every pay period, minimum wage workers receive a check from their employer for an amount greater than they would otherwise have received. This can have a profound effect on workers’ view of their place in society: for example, after a 1999 living wage ordinance raised his wage nearly $2 per hour, a janitor at the Los Angeles airport remarked that, while he and his coworkers still did not make much money, “at least now with the living wage, we can hold our heads up high.”158

This is not about the economic impact but the implication of status that the workers have such a enforcible legal claim against employers. **ROGERS (2)**[[6]](#footnote-6)**:** 2. Formal Legal Entitlements and Self-Respect.—Minimum wage laws also enhance workers’ self-respect by granting them formal legal entitlements vis-à-vis employers. This is in part an expressive effect of minimum wage laws, which are an easily grasped policy “that symbolizes the political system’s commitment to working people.”165 Such laws signal that the state and broader society view workers as worthy of legal protection, even when doing so imposes costs upon more powerful social groups, as captured well in the textile worker quote in this Article’s introduction. But the legal entitlements provided by minimum wage laws are not merely symbolic. Under such laws, workers can hale employers into court to prevent enforcement of labor contracts that pay less than the minimum, employers owe workers correlative duties, and state agencies stand ready to intervene on behalf of workers. The relationship between formal rights and self-respect is an enormous topic, but a few notes on that relationship within political and social theory should suffice to develop this point. Within liberalism, this idea seems to have animated Rawls’s argument that in a just society “self-respect is secured by the public affirmation of the status of equal citizenship for all” through protection of equal liberties,166 as well as through the fact that “everyone endorses the difference principle, itself a form of reciprocity.”167 Public affirmation of such rights helps demonstrate that rights-bearing individuals are moral equals of other citizens. Once that moral equality is clear, employers will not as readily subject such workers to abuses, and workers will more readily contest unfair treatment by employers and other private actors. The relationship between rights and self-respect is also clear in Pettit’s republicanism. An “employee who dare not raise a complaint against an employer,” Pettit writes, is in the sort of relationship of domination that neorepublicans condemn.168 While the most straightforward implication of Pettit’s argument may be that employees deserve general rights to contest employer decisions, or rights against arbitrary dismissal,169 substantive entitlements such as the minimum wage have a similar effect insofar as they enable employees to block employer efforts to pay below a certain point. This rights-granting aspect means that minimum wage laws are actually not equivalent to a wage subsidy funded by a tax on low-wage labor, because this entitlement and its accompanying private right of action alter the power dynamics between employer and employee. The literature on law and social movements also helps elucidate the relationship between legal rights and self-respect. Much of this literature explores the relationship between legal rights and collective mobilization, an issue less central to this Article.170 But the very existence of such a link demonstrates that legal rights, particularly rights against private parties, can be an important social basis of self-respect. Per Stuart Scheingold’s influential account of the “politics of rights,” for example, marginalized groups can “capitalize on the perceptions of entitlement associated with [legal][[7]](#footnote-7) rights to initiate and to nurture political mobilization.”171 This process can have effects on workers’ self-consciousness and self-respect that extend well beyond immediate campaigns. As two other sociologists argue in a leading study of social movements among the poor, after the assertion of legal rights as part of a demand for social change, “people who ordinarily consider themselves helpless come to believe that they have some capacity to alter their lot.”172 Similarly, I have argued elsewhere that the experience of contesting managerial decisions during union organizing can greatly enhance workers’ autonomy by giving them a concrete experience of agency.173 In fact, organizers have often mobilized workers around the rightsendowing aspect of minimum wage laws. For example, Jennifer Gordon, founder of the Long Island-based Workplace Project and now a professor of law, developed an innovative workers-rights curriculum that elucidated the gaps among workers’ rights to safety and minimum wages, workers’ lived experience of unsafe workplaces and sub-minimum wages, and a broader vision of justice that would involve even greater legal protections than those currently enjoyed.174 Where standard “know your rights” presentations began by listing a set of formal entitlements, Gordon instead flipped the class: she first asked workers to describe their own experiences in detail and then pointed out that their employers were in fact violating the law.175 This was a transformative experience: “rights stood for the possibility of government support in a context where government was otherwise notably absent, in an underground economy ruled by the market and by personal relationships in a situation of unmitigated power imbalance.”176 The fact that working conditions had been illegal rather than merely unfortunate altered workers’ perceptions of their work lives and even their selves. Workers began to view themselves as entitled to decent treatment, as having a right to have rights.177 Gordon’s account resonates with a strand in the social-psychological literature on “collective action framing,” which explores how socialmovement leaders and participants describe particular actions or conditions in ways that motivate social groups to take collective action.178 As legal scholar Benjamin Sachs has argued, efforts such as Gordon’s “deploy employment rights statutes as diagnostic frames,” utilizing those statutes to describe extremely low wages as an injustice.179 “The fact that it is the law—rather than merely the ideology of a union organizer or other activist—that diagnoses these problems as injustice invests the frame with substantially increased power.”

Self-respect is necessary to individuals rightly ordering their loves, because that form of self-love is necessary for them to be able to view positively the orientation of their own passions. **RAWLS**[[8]](#footnote-8)**:** On several occasions I have mentioned that perhaps the most important primary good is that of self-respect. We must make sure that the conception of goodness as rationality explains why this should be so. We may deﬁne self-respect (or self-esteem) as having two aspects. First of all, as we noted earlier (§29), it includes a person’s sense of [their] own value, his secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out. And second, self-respect implies a conﬁdence in one’s ability, so far as it is within one’s power, to fulﬁll one’s intentions. When we feel that our plans are of little value, we cannot pursue them with pleasure or take delight in their execution. Nor plagued by failure and self-doubt can we continue in our endeavors. It is clear then why self-respect is a primary good. Without it nothing may seem worth doing, or if some things have value for us, we lack the will to strive for them. All desire and activity becomes empty and vain, and we sink into apathy and cynicism. Therefore the parties in the original position would wish to avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect. The fact that justice as fairness gives more support to self-esteem than other principles is a strong reason for them to adopt it. The conception of goodness as rationality allows us to characterize more fully the circumstances that support the ﬁrst aspect of self-esteem, the sense of our own worth. These are essentially two: (1) having a rational plan of life, and in particular one that satisﬁes the Aristotelian Principle; and (2) ﬁnding our person and deeds appreciated and conﬁrmed by others who are likewise esteemed and their association enjoyed. I assume then that someone’s plan of life will lack a certain attraction for him if it fails to call upon his natural capacities in an interesting fashion. When activities fail to satisfy the Aristotelian Principle, they are likely to seem dull and ﬂat, and to give us no feeling of competence or a sense that they are worth doing. A person tends to be more conﬁdent of his value when his abilities are both fully realized and organized in ways of suitable complexity and reﬁnement.

This o/w – self-love is mutually reinforcing, magnifying its own impacts. **RAWLS (2)**[[9]](#footnote-9)Furthermore, the public recognition of the two principles gives greater support to men[persons]’s self-respect and this in turn increases the effectiveness of social cooperation. Both effects are reasons for agreeing to these principles. It is clearly rational for men to secure their self-respect. A sense of their own worth is necessary if they are to pursue their conception of the good with satisfaction and to take pleasure in its fulﬁllment. Self-respect is not so much a part of any rational plan of life as the sense that one’s plan is worth carrying out. Now our self-respect normally depends upon the respect of others. Unless we feel that our endeavors are respected by them, it is difﬁcult if not impossible for us to maintain the conviction that our ends are worth advancing (§67). Hence for this reason the parties would accept the natural duty of mutual respect which asks them to treat one another civilly and to be willing to explain the grounds of their actions, especially when the claims of others are overruled (§51). Moreover, one may assume that those who respect themselves are more likely to respect each other and conversely. Self-contempt leads to contempt of others and threatens their good as much as envy does. Self-respect is reciprocally self-supporting.

**Second,** a proper love of people in labor requires a disposition towards adequate compensation. Just as stealing someone’s property is to fail to regard either them or their property with the proper worth, so too for the state to fail to require just compensation involves either an improper love to the laborer or labor. Failing to pay a living wage involves inadequate love of labor as a foundational social good. **LEO[[10]](#footnote-10):** 33. There is another and deeper consideration which must not be lost sight of. As regards the State, the interests of all, whether high or low, are equal. The members of the working classes are citizens by nature and by the same right as the rich; they are real parts, living the life which makes up, through the family, the body of the commonwealth; and it need hardly be said that they are in every city very largely in the majority. It would be irrational to neglect one portion of the citizens and favor another, and therefore the public administration must duly and solicitously provide for the welfare and the comfort of the working classes; otherwise, that law of justice will be violated which ordains that each man shall have his due. To cite the wise words of St. Thomas Aquinas: "As the part and the whole are in a certain sense identical, so that which belongs to the whole in a sense belongs to the part."(27) Among the many and grave duties of rulers who would do their best for the people, the first and chief is to act with strict justice - with that justice which is called distributive - toward each and every class alike. 34. But although all citizens, without exception, can and ought to contribute to that common good in which individuals share so advantageously to themselves, yet it should not be supposed that all can contribute in the like way and to the same extent. No matter what changes may occur in forms of government, there will ever be differences and inequalities of condition in the State. Society cannot exist or be conceived of without them. Some there must be who devote themselves to the work of the commonwealth, who make the laws or administer justice, or whose advice and authority govern the nation in times of peace, and defend it in war. Such men clearly occupy the foremost place in the State, and should be held in highest estimation, for their work concerns most nearly and effectively the general interests of the community. Those who labor at a trade or calling do not promote the general welfare in such measure as this, but they benefit the nation, if less directly, in a most important manner. We have insisted, it is true, that, since the end of society is to make men better, the chief good that society can possess is virtue. Nevertheless, it is the business of a well-constituted body politic to see to the provision of those material and external helps "the use of which is necessary to virtuous action."(28) Now, for the provision of such commodities, the labor of the working class - the exercise of their skill, and the employment of their strength, in the cultivation of the land, and in the workshops of trade - is especially responsible and quite indispensable. Indeed, their co-operation is in this respect so important that it may be truly said that it is only by the labor of working men that States grow rich. Justice, therefore, demands that the interests of the working classes should be carefully watched over by the administration, so that they who contribute so largely to the advantage of the community may themselves share in the benefits which they create-that being housed, clothed, and bodily fit, they may find their life less hard and more endurable. It follows that whatever shall appear to prove conducive to the well-being of those who work should obtain favorable consideration. There is no fear that solicitude of this kind will be harmful to any interest; on the contrary, it will be to the advantage of all, for it cannot but be good for the commonwealth to shield from misery those on whom it so largely depends for the things that it needs. 35. We have said that the State must not absorb the individual or the family; both should be allowed free and untrammelled action so far as is consistent with the common good and the interest of others. Rulers should, nevertheless, anxiously safeguard the community and all its members; the community, because the conservation thereof is so emphatically the business of the supreme power, that the safety of the commonwealth is not only the first law, but it is a government's whole reason of existence; and the members, because both philosophy and the Gospel concur in laying down that the object of the government of the State should be, not the advantage of the ruler, but the benefit of those over whom he is placed. As the power to rule comes from God, and is, as it were, a participation in His, the highest of all sovereignties, it should be exercised as the power of God is exercised - with a fatherly solicitude which not only guides the whole, but reaches also individuals. 36. Whenever the general interest or any particular class suffers, or is threatened with harm, which can in no other way be met or prevented, the public authority must step in to deal with it. Now, it is to the interest of the community, as well as of the individual, that peace and good order should be maintained; that all things should be carried on in accordance with God's laws and those of nature; that the discipline of family life should be observed and that religion should be obeyed; that a high standard of morality should prevail, both in public and private life; that justice should be held sacred and that no one should injure another with impunity; that the members of the commonwealth should grow up to man's estate strong and robust, and capable, if need be, of guarding and defending their country. If by a strike of workers or concerted interruption of work there should be imminent danger of disturbance to the public peace; or if circumstances were such as that among the working class the ties of family life were relaxed; if religion were found to suffer through the workers not having time and opportunity afforded them to practice its duties; if in workshops and factories there were danger to morals through the mixing of the sexes or from other harmful occasions of evil; or if employers laid burdens upon their workmen which were unjust, or degraded them with conditions repugnant to their dignity as human beings; finally, if health were endangered by excessive labor, or by work unsuited to sex or age - in such cases, there can be no question but that, within certain limits, it would be right to invoke the aid and authority of the law. The limits must be determined by the nature of the occasion which calls for the law's interference - the principle being that the law must not undertake more, nor proceed further, than is required for the remedy of the evil or the removal of the mischief. 37. Rights must be religiously respected wherever they exist, and it is the duty of the public authority to prevent and to punish injury, and to protect every one in the possession of [their] own. Still, when there is question of defending the rights of individuals, the poor and badly off have a claim to special consideration. The richer class have many ways of shielding themselves, and stand less in need of help from the State; whereas the mass of the poor have no resources of their own to fall back upon, and must chiefly depend upon the assistance of the State. And it is for this reason that wage-earners, since they mostly belong in the mass of the needy, should be specially cared for and protected by the government.

Work is a means to cultivate personal material, social, and cultural purposes. Governments are not non-normative backdrops; they are social constructs which construct legislative and normative conditions that define the economy. When one ‘allows’ the free market they positively create the market with features for which they are responsible. The government is an ‘indirect employer’ involved in wages. **JOHN PAUL II:[[11]](#footnote-11)** The distinction between the direct and the indirect employeris **seen to be very** important when one considers **both** the way **in which** labour is actually organizedand the possibility of the formation of **just or** unjust relationships in the field of labour. **Since** the direct employer is the person **or institution** with whom the worker enters directly into **a work** contract **in accordance with definite conditions,** we must understand as the indirect employer [is] many different factors, **other than the direct employer,** that exercise **a** determining influence on **the shaping both of** the work contract and, **consequently, of** just or unjust relationships in **the field of human** labour. **17. Direct and Indirect Employer** The **concept of** indirect employerincludes **both** persons **and** institutions **of various kinds, and also** collective **labour** contractsand **the** principles of conduct **which are laid down by these persons and institutions and** which determine the whole socioeconomic system **or are its result. The concept of "indirect employer" thus refers to many different elements.** The responsibility of the indirect employer **differs from that of the direct employer-the term itself indicates that the responsibility is less direct-but it** remains a true responsibility: [it] the indirect employer substantially determines **one or other** facet of the labour relationship, **thus conditioning the conduct of the direct employer when the latter determines in concrete terms the actual work contract and labour relations.** This is **not to absolve the direct employer from his own responsibility, but only** to draw attention to the whole network of influences that condition **his** conduct.When it is a question of **establishing** an ethically correct labour policy, all these influences must be kept in mind. **A policy is correct when the objective rights of the worker are fully respected.** The concept of indirect employer is applicable to every society, and in the first place to the State. For **it is** the State that must conduct a just labour policy. **However, it is common knowledge that** in the present system **of economic relations in the world** there are numerous links **between individual States, links that find expression, for instance, in the import and export process, that is to say, in the mutual exchange of economic goods, whether raw materials, semimanufactured goods, or finished industrial products.** These **links also** create mutual dependence**, and as a result it would be difficult to speak, in the case of any State, even the economically most powerful, of complete self-sufficiency or autarky.** Such a system **of mutual dependence is in itself normal. However, it** can **easily become an** occasion **for various forms of** exploitation **or injustice and as a result influence the labour policy of individual States; and finally it can influence the individual worker, who is the proper subject of labour. For instance the** highly industrialized countries, and **even more the** businessesthat direct **on a** large scale **the means of** industrial production **(the companies referred to as multinational or transnational),** fix the highest possible prices for their products, while **trying at the same time to fix** the lowest possible prices for raw materials **or semi-manufactured goods. This is one of the causes of an ever increasing disproportion between national incomes. The gap between most of the richest countries and the poorest ones is not diminishing or being stabilized but is increasing more and more, to the detriment, obviously, of the poor countries. Evidently** this must **have an** effect **on** local labour policy **and on the worker's situation in the economically disadvantaged societies.** Finding himself in a system thus conditioned, the direct employer fixes working conditions below the objective requirements of the workers, **especially if he himself wishes to obtain the highest possible profits from the business which he runs (or from the businesses which he runs, in the case of a situation of "socialized" ownership of the means of production). It is easy to see that this framework of forms of dependence linked with the concept of the indirect employer is enormously extensive and complicated. It is determined, in a sense, by all the elements that are decisive for economic life within a given society and state, but also by much wider links and forms of dependence.** The attainment of the worker's rights cannot **however** be doomed to be merely a result of economic systems which **on a larger or smaller scale** are guided chiefly by the criterion of maximum profit. **On the contrary,** it is respect for the **objective** rights of the worker**-every kind of worker: manual or intellectual, industrial or agricultural, etc.-**that must constitute the adequate and fundamental criterion for shaping the whole economy, **both** on the level of the individual society **and State** and within the whole of the world economic policy and of the systems of international relationships that derive from it. **Influence in this direction should be exercised by all the International Organizations whose concern it is, beginning with the United Nations Organization. It appears that the International Labour Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and other bodies too have fresh contributions to offer on this point in particular. Within the individual States there are ministries or public departments and also various social institutions set up for this purpose. All of this effectively indicates the importance of the indirect employer-as has been said above-in achieving full respect for the worker's rights, since the rights of the human person are the key element in the whole of the social moral order.**

extra offense:

Employment for a decent wage enhances workers’ self-respect – studies prove. **LEVIN-WALDMAN[[12]](#footnote-12):** Living wages, then, become a means of offering low-wage workers voice, which in turn enhances personal autonomy - a basic ingredient in the meaning of citizenship, which is also a basic principle in republi- can political thought. It does not give greater voice in that it increases the bargaining power among low-skilled workers in the way that unions do. But it does give them greater voice in that higher wages improve their morale and thereby enable them to have greater dignity in their work. **In a study on the effects of a living wage in Baltimore**, for in- stance, Neidt et al. (1998) found that **based on interviews with those workers who received** pay increases as **a** function of the **living wage, most responded that they felt better** about themselves because **they were earning more** (pp. 27-28). **Individuals who earn more are more likely to participate in the democratic process**, even if their participation is restricted to the most nominal form of participation: voting. But the fact that they feel better about themselves alone should enable them to be- have more autonomously. On a more basic level, however, by providing individuals with greater income, it affords them greater opportunity to pursue their own respec- tive self-interests. In short, it enhances autonomy. To a certain extent, a living wage effectively provides individuals with perhaps what Amy Guttmann and Dennis Thompson (1996) refer to as a fair opportunity. Were this, for instance, a deliberative democracy, they argue, a basic opportunity principle would secure citizens an adequate level of basic opportunity goods. Included in such opportunity goods is that of an ad- equate income level, which they define as that which enables one to live a decent life according to society's current standards. And yet, this is not the same as equality of opportunity, rather they suggest that the operative principle ought to be fair opportunity. Fair opportunity holds that government should ensure that each citizen has a fair chance of securing opportunity goods such as advanced education and skilled employment, i.e., those tools that will enable individuals to secure the types of positions that enable them to live comfortable middle class lives, which clearly has implications for society's income distribution. But by talking about opportunity to join the middle class, they in essence ac- knowledge the importance of the middle class to the maintenance of democracy. When they talk about a basic opportunity principle, they are specifically talking about it within the context of welfare provision. And yet, there is no reason that ordinances mandating that workers be paid a specified wage cannot be viewed in similar terms.

To respect and love persons requires wages to be set by concerns of dignity over and against mere market value. **LEO XIII[[13]](#footnote-13):** 19. The great mistake made in regard to the matter now under consideration is to take up with the notion that class is naturally hostile to class, and that the wealthy and the working men are intended by nature to live in mutual conflict. So irrational and so false is this view that the direct contrary is the truth. Just as the symmetry of the human frame is the result of the suitable arrangement of the different parts of the body, so in a State is it ordained by nature that these two classes should dwell in harmony and agreement, so as to maintain the balance of the body politic. Each needs the other: capital cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital. Mutual agreement results in the beauty of good order, while perpetual conflict necessarily produces confusion and savage barbarity. Now, in preventing such strife as this, and in uprooting it, the efficacy of Christian institutions is marvellous and manifold. First of all, there is no intermediary more powerful than religion (whereof the Church is the interpreter and guardian) in drawing the rich and the working class together, by reminding each of its duties to the other, and especially of the obligations of justice. 20. Of these duties, the following bind the proletarian and the worker: fully and faithfully to perform the work which has been freely and equitably agreed upon; never to injure the property, nor to outrage the person, of an employer; never to resort to violence in defending their own cause, nor to engage in riot or disorder; and to have nothing to do with men of evil principles, who work upon the people with artful promises of great results, and excite foolish hopes which usually end in useless regrets and grievous loss. The following duties bind the wealthy owner and the employer: not to look upon their work people as their bondsmen, but to respect in every [hu]man [their] dignity as a person ennobled by Christian character. They are reminded that, according to natural reason and Christian philosophy, working for gain is creditable, not shameful, to a man, since it enables him to earn an honorable livelihood; but to misuse men as though they were things in the pursuit of gain, or to value them solely for their physical powers - that is truly shameful and inhuman. Again justice demands that, in dealing with the working man, religion and the good of his soul must be kept in mind. Hence, the employer is bound to see that the worker has time for his religious duties; that he be not exposed to corrupting influences and dangerous occasions; and that he be not led away to neglect his home and family, or to squander his earnings. Furthermore, the employer must never tax his work people beyond their strength, or employ them in work unsuited to their sex and age. His great and principal duty is to give every one what is just. Doubtless, before deciding whether wages are fair, many things have to be considered; but wealthy owners and all masters of labor should be mindful of this - that to exercise pressure upon the indigent and the destitute for the sake of gain, and to gather one's profit out of the need of another, is condemned by all laws, human and divine. To defraud any one of wages that are his due is a great crime which cries to the avenging anger of Heaven. "Behold, the hire of the laborers... which by fraud has been kept back by you, crieth; and the cry of them hath entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth."(6) Lastly, the rich must religiously refrain from cutting down the workmen's earnings, whether by force, by fraud, or by usurious dealing; and with all the greater reason because the laboring man is, as a rule, weak and unprotected, and because his slender means should in proportion to their scantiness be accounted sacred. Were these precepts carefully obeyed and followed out, would they not be sufficient of themselves to keep under all strife and all its causes?

Governments are not non-normative backdrops for economic dealings; they are positive social constructs which create and sustain conditions that define labor. The economy is a constructed space by which legislative and normative rules define interaction. When one ‘allows’ the market they positively create the market with features for which they are responsible. We must understand both the government as ‘indirect employers’ involved in the setting of wages who must determine what wages should be. **JOHN PAUL II:[[14]](#footnote-14)** The distinction between the direct and the indirect employeris **seen to be very** important when one considers **both** the way **in which** labour is actually organizedand the possibility of the formation of **just or** unjust relationships in the field of labour. **Since** the direct employer is the person **or institution** with whom the worker enters directly into a work contract in accordance with definite conditions, we must understand as the indirect employer [is] many different factors, other than the direct employer, that exercise a determining influence on the shaping both of the work contract and, **consequently, of** just or unjust relationships in **the field of human** labour. **17. Direct** and Indirect Employer The concept of indirect employer includes both persons and institutions of various kinds, and also collective labour contracts and the principles of conduct which are laid down by these persons and institutions and which determine the whole socioeconomic system or are its result. The concept of "indirect employer" thus refers to many different **elements.** The responsibility of the indirect employer differs from that of the direct employer-the term itself indicates that the responsibility is less direct-but it remains a true responsibility: [it] the indirect employer substantially determines one or other facet of the labour relationship, thus conditioning the conduct of the direct employer when the latter determines in concrete terms the actual work contract and labour relations. This is not to absolve the direct employer from his own responsibility, but only to draw attention to the whole network of influences that condition his conduct. When it is a question of establishing an ethically correct labour policy, all these influences must be kept in mind. A policy is correct when the objective rights of the worker are fully respected. The concept of indirect employer is applicable to every society, and in the first place to the State. For it is the State that must conduct a just labour policy. However, it is common knowledge that in the present system of economic relations in the world there are numerous links between individual States, links that find expression, for instance, in the import and export **process, that is to say, in the mutual exchange** of economic goods, whether raw materials, semimanufactured goods, or finished industrial products. These links also create mutual dependence, and as a result it would be difficult to speak, in the case of any State, even the economically most powerful, of complete self-sufficiency or autarky. Such a system of mutual dependence is in itself normal. However, it can easily become an occasion for various forms of exploitation or injustice and as a result influence the labour policy of individual States; and finally it can influence the individual worker, who is the proper subject of labour. For instance the highly industrialized countries, and even more the businesses that direct **on a** large scale **the means of** industrial production **(the companies referred to as multinational** or transnational), fix the highest possible prices for their products, while trying at the same time to fix the lowest possible prices for raw materials or semi-manufactured goods. This is one of the causes of an ever increasing disproportion between national incomes. The gap between most of the richest countries and the poorest ones is not diminishing or being stabilized but is increasing more and more, to the detriment, obviously, of the poor countries. 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The attainment of the worker's rights cannot however be doomed to be merely a result of economic systems which **on a larger or smaller scale** are guided chiefly by the criterion of maximum profit. On the contrary, it is respect for the objective rights of the worker-every kind of worker: manual or intellectual, industrial or agricultural, etc.-that must constitute the adequate and fundamental criterion for shaping the whole economy, both on the level of the individual society and State and within the whole of the world economic policy and of the systems of international relationships that derive from it. Influence in this direction should be exercised by all the International Organizations whose concern it is, beginning with the United Nations Organization. It appears that the International Labour Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and other bodies too have fresh contributions to offer on this point in particular. Within the individual States there are ministries or public departments and also various social institutions set up for this purpose. All of this effectively indicates the importance of the indirect employer-as has been said above-in achieving full respect for the worker's rights, since the rights of the human person are the key element in the whole of the social moral order.

Using the market as sufficient determinant of wages fails to differentiate humans from merchandise. **PAUL:[[15]](#footnote-15)** For certain supporters of such ideas, work was understood and treated as a sort of "merchandise" that the worker-especially the industrial worker-sells to the employer, who at the same time is the possessor of the capital, that is to say, of all the working tools and means that make production possible. This way of looking at work was widespread especially in the first half of the nineteenth century. Since then, explicit expressions of this sort have almost disappeared, and have given way to more human ways of thinking about work and evaluating it. The interaction between the worker and the tools and means of production has given rise to the development of various forms of capitalism - parallel with various forms of collectivism - into which other socioeconomic elements have entered as a consequence of new concrete circumstances, of the activity of workers' associations and public autorities, and of the emergence of large transnational enterprises. Nevertheless, the danger of treating work as a special kind of "merchandise", or as an impersonal "force" needed for production (the expression "workforce" is in fact in common use) always exists, especially when the whole way of looking at the question of economics is marked by the premises of materialistic economism. A systematic opportunity for thinking and evaluating in this way, and in a certain sense a stimulus for doing so, is provided by the quickening process of the development of a onesidedly materialistic civilization, which gives prime importance to the objective dimension of work, while the subjective dimension-everything in direct or indirect relationship with the subject of work-remains on a secondary level. In all cases of this sort, in every social situation of this type, there is a confusion or even a reversal of the order laid down from the beginning by the words of the Book of Genesis: man is treated as an instrument of production12, whereas he-he alone, independently of the work he does-ought to be treated as the effective subject of work and its true maker and creator. Precisely this reversal of order, whatever the programme or name under which it occurs, should rightly be called "capitalism"-in the sense more fully explained below. Everybody knows that capitalism has a definite historical meaning as a system, an economic and social system, opposed to "socialism" or "communism". But in the light of the analysis of the fundamental reality of the whole economic process-first and foremost of the production structure that work is-it should be recognized that the error of early capitalism can be repeated wherever [a hu]man is in a way treated on the same level as the whole complex of the material means of production, as an instrument and not in accordance with the true dignity of his work-that is to say, where [they are] not treated as subject and maker, and for this very reason as the true purpose of the whole process of production.

The dignity of work reflects the dignity of individuals; it must provide resources to live fully as a flourishing individual. **PCJP[[16]](#footnote-16):** 301. The rights of workers, like all other rights, are based on the nature of the human person and **on** his transcendent dignity. The Church's social Magisterium has seen fit to list some of these rights, in the hope that they will be recognized in juridical systems: the right to a just wage; [651] the right to rest; [652] the right “to a working environment and to manufacturing processes which are not harmful to the workers' physical health or to their moral integrity”; [653] the right that one's personality in the workplace should be safeguarded “without suffering any affront to one's conscience or personal dignity”; [654] the right to appropriate subsidies that are necessary for the subsistence of unemployed workers and their families; [655] the right to a pension and to insurance for old age, sickness, and in case of work-related accidents; [656] the right to social security connected with maternity; [657] the right to assemble and form associations.[658] These rights are often infringed, as is confirmed by the sad fact of workers who are underpaid and without protection or adequate representation. It often happens that work conditions for men, women and children, especially in developing countries, are so inhumane that they are an offence to their dignity and compromise their health. b. The right to fair remuneration and income distribution 302. Remuneration is the most important means for achieving justice in work relationships.[659] The “just wage is the legitimate fruit of work”.[660] They commit grave injustice who refuse to pay a just wage or who do not give it in due time and in proportion to the work done (cf. Lv 19:13; Dt 24:14-15; Jas 5:4). A salary is the instrument that permits the labourer to gain access to the goods of the earth. “Remuneration for labour is to be such that man may be furnished the means to cultivate worthily his own material, social, cultural, and spiritual life and that of his dependents, in view of the function and productiveness of each one, the conditions of the factory or workshop, and the common good”.[661] The simple agreement between employee and employer with regard to the amount of pay to be received is not sufficient for the agreed-upon salary to qualify as a “just wage”, because a just wage “must not be below the level of subsistence”[662] of the worker: natural justice precedes and is above the freedom of the contract.

Given centrality of labor to improvement of society, those who work should share access to betterment through remuneration. AND, living wage protects dignity given the lack of external checks. **LEO[[17]](#footnote-17):** 33. There is another and deeper consideration which must not be lost sight of. As regards the State, the interests of all, whether high or low, are equal. The members of the working classes are citizens **by nature and** by the same right as the rich; they are real parts, living the life which makes up, through the family, the body of the commonwealth; and it need hardly be said that they are in every city very largely in the majority. It would be irrational to neglect one portion of the citizens and favor another, and therefore the public administration must duly and solicitously provide for the welfare **and the** comfort of the working classes; otherwise, that law of justice will be violated which ordains that each man shall have his due. To cite the wise words of St. Thomas Aquinas: "As the part and the whole are in a certain sense identical, so that which belongs to the whole in a sense belongs to the part."(27) Among the many and grave duties of rulers who would do their best for the people, the first and chief is to act with strict justice - with that justice which is called distributive - toward each and every class alike. 34. But although all citizens, without exception, can and ought to contribute to that common goodin which individuals share so advantageously to themselves, yet it should not be supposed that all can contribute in the like way and to the same extent. No matter what changes may occur in forms of government, there will ever be differences and inequalities of condition in the State. Society cannot exist or be conceived of without them. Some there must be who devote themselves to the work of the commonwealth, who make the laws or administer justice, or whose advice and authority govern the nation in times of peace, and defend it in war. Such men clearly occupy the foremost place in the State, and should be held in highest estimation, for their work concerns most nearly and effectively the general interests of the community. Those who labor at a trade or calling do not promote the general welfare in such measure as this, but they benefit the nation, if less directly, in a most important manner. We have insisted, it is true, that, since the end of society is to make men better, the chief good that society can possess is virtue. Nevertheless, it is the business of a well-constituted body politic to see to the provision of those material and external helps "the use of which is necessary to virtuous action."(28) Now, for the provision of such commodities, the labor of the working class - the exercise of their skill, and the employment of their strength, in the cultivation of the land, and in the workshops of trade - is especially responsible and quite indispensable. Indeed, their co-operation is in this respect so important that it may be truly said that it is only by the labor of working men that States grow rich. Justice, therefore, demands that the interests of the working classes should be carefully watched over by the administration, so that they who contribute so largely to the advantage of the community may themselves share in the benefits which they create-that being housed, clothed, and bodily fit, they may find their life less hard and more endurable. It follows that whatever shall appear to prove conducive to the well-being of those who work should obtain favorable consideration. There is no fear that solicitude of this kind will be harmful to any interest; on the contrary, it will be to the advantage of all, for it cannot but be good for the commonwealth to shield from misery those on whom it so largely depends for the things that it needs. 35. We have said that the State must not absorb the individual or the family; both should be allowed free and untrammelled action so far as is consistent with the common good and the interest of others. Rulers should, nevertheless, anxiously safeguard the community and all its members; the community, because the conservation thereof is so emphatically the business of the supreme power, that the safety of the commonwealth is not only the first law, but it is a government's whole reason of existence; and the members, because both philosophy and the Gospel concur in laying down that the object of the government of the State should be, not the advantage of the ruler, but the benefit of those over whom he is placed. As the power to rule comes from God, and is, as it were, a participation in His, the highest of all sovereignties, it should be exercised as the power of God is exercised - with a fatherly solicitude which not only guides the whole, but reaches also individuals. 36. Whenever the general interest or any particular class suffers, or is threatened with harm, which can in no other way be met or prevented, the public authority must step in to deal with it. Now, it is to the interest of the community, as well as of the individual, that peace and good order should be maintained; that all things should be carried on in accordance with God's laws and those of nature; that the discipline of family life should be observed and that religion should be obeyed; that a high standard of morality should prevail, both in public and private life; that justice should be held sacred and that no one should injure another with impunity; that the members of the commonwealth should grow up to man's estate strong and robust, and capable, if need be, of guarding and defending their country. If by a strike of workers or concerted interruption of work there should be imminent danger of disturbance to the public peace; or if circumstances were such as that among the working class the ties of family life were relaxed; if religion were found to suffer through the workers not having time and opportunity afforded them to practice its duties; if in workshops and factories there were danger to morals through the mixing of the sexes or from other harmful occasions of evil; or if employers laid burdens upon their workmen which were unjust, or degraded them with conditions repugnant to their dignity as human beings; finally, if health were endangered by excessive labor, or by work unsuited to sex or age - in such cases, there can be no question but that, within certain limits, it would be right to invoke the aid and authority of the law. The limits must be determined by the nature of the occasion which calls for the law's interference - the principle being that the law must not undertake more, nor proceed further, than is required for the remedy of the evil or the removal of the mischief. 37. Rights must be religiously respected wherever they exist,and it is the duty of the public authority to prevent and to punish injury, and to protect every one in the possession of [their] own. Still, when there is question of defending the rights of individuals, the poor **and badly off** have a claim to special consideration. The richer class have many ways of shielding themselves, and stand less in need of help from the State; whereas the mass of the poor have no resources of their own to fall back upon, and must chiefly depend upon the assistance of the State. And it is for this reason that wage-earners, since they mostly belong in the mass of the needy, should be specially cared for and protected by the government.

Another card. **LEO[[18]](#footnote-18):** 43. We now approach a subject of great importance, and one in respect of which, if extremes are to be avoided, right notions are absolutely necessary. Wages, as we are told, are regulated by free consent, and therefore the employer, when he pays what was agreed upon, has done his part and seemingly is not called upon to do anything beyond. The only way, it is said, in which injustice might occur would be if the master refused to pay the whole of the wages, or if the workman should not complete the work undertaken; in such cases the public authority should intervene, to see that each obtains his due, but not under any other circumstances. 44. To this kind of argument a fair-minded man will not easily or entirely assent; it is not complete, for there are important considerations which it leaves out of account altogether. To labor is to exert oneself for the sake of procuring what is necessary for the various purposes of life, and chief of all for self preservation. "In the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat bread."(33) Hence, a man's labor **necessarily** bears two **notes or** characters.First **of all,** it is personal, inasmuch as the force which acts is bound up with the personality and is the exclusive property of [they] who acts, and, further, was given to him for his advantage. Secondly, man's labor is necessary; for without the result of labor a [person] cannot live, and self-preservation is a law of nature, which it is wrong to **disobey. Now,** were we to consider labor merely **in so far** as **it is** personal**, doubtless** it would be **within the workman's** right to accept any rate of wages **whatsoever; for in the same way as he is free to work or not, so is he free to accept a small wage or even none at all.** But our conclusion must be very different if, **together with the personal element in a man's work,** we consider **the fact** that work is also necessary **for him** to live: **these two** aspects of his work are separable in thought, but not in reality. The preservation of life is the bounden duty of one and all, and to be wanting therein is a crime. It necessarily follows that each one has a natural right to procure what is required in order to live, and the poor can procure that in no other way than by what they can earn through their work.

AT state-based offense:

Cross-apply the extension of Rogers. And your state based CPs don’t solve. **ROGERS**[[19]](#footnote-19)**:** The fact that employment is a bilateral and reciprocal relationship justifies the institutional form of minimum wage laws, i.e., the requirement that employers themselves pay higher wages. The harsh conditions and **status harms** of low-wage employment **do not occur in a vacuum: employers** and managers **enjoy** individualized and **institutional benefits** from workers’ efforts, benefits that are **not** always **shared** **with** the rest of **society**. **Those include** profits as well as the **higher** **social esteem and occupational autonomy** that accompany entrepreneurship and management. Given such agent-specific benefits, and **given that such benefits occur** **within social structures** **that impose reciprocal harms** on employees, **it seems entirely appropriate for employers to shoulder the** bulk of the **redistributive burdens** imposed by minimum wage laws, **rather than** **mediating all redistribution through the state.** **Transfers** simply have a different valence: they **alter power relationships between workers and employers indirectly, if at all. While a robust basic income would enable workers to reject truly undignified work**, it would not alter the legal rules that undergird the division of labor.159 Employers would still enjoy the legal right to issue orders and low-wage workers would still need to obey. Altering parties’ bilateral entitlements is therefore an appropriate policy response. **Minimum wages are also far more salient to workers** than transfers.160 As noted above, **wages are paid weekly or biweekly** by the employer, **reflecting the employer’s reciprocal duties toward workers; in contrast transfers come from the state, an abstract entity that typically exerts power over workers only indirectly.** Wage subsidies would avoid some of these difficulties since workers receive money directly from their employer, but wage subsidies have other drawbacks, as discussed below.161 To be clear, this is not an argument that minimum wage laws require employers to personally express respect for workers. Since respect is an aspect of social relationships, it simply cannot be mandated by the state. 162 But the state often does forbid practices and behaviors that tend to undermine individuals’ self-respect, or, in Rawls’s evocative phrasing, practices that encourage “attitudes of deference and servility on one side [and] a will to dominate and arrogance on the other.”163 Rules against sexual and racial harassment are a powerful and clear example.164 Minimum wage laws are another. They prohibit a certain class of employment relationships that lead to pervasive status harms. Moreover, even if employers pay minimum wages grudgingly, doing so may well reinforce workers’ self-respect by demonstrating that the law protects them against certain employer actions.

I reflect and foster virtue in the employer, whereas you do not. Since they enjoy the virtuous benefits, they should have responsibility and duty fostered by respecting employees. You do not enhance self-respect because they are receiving handouts rather than being told their labor has value. Prefer working since 1) work enables upward mobility, supporting families which are where we are brought up and have virtue fostered 2) work is better since it shows commitment to charity and usefulness, which are moral virtues as opposed to laziness or sloth from handouts 3) work fosters self-sufficiency, which is virtuous since it says that we are responsible moral agents rather than entitled.

AT DEONT fwk warrants:

1. Morality must be grounded in character, not action given the complexity of moral language – that implies virtue ethics. **GRYZ:**[[20]](#footnote-20) The way we use words ‘good/bad’ and ‘right/wrong’ seems to support the above claims. Goodness and badness come in degrees, hence we have words like ‘better’ and ‘worse’**; we lack similar** terms for deontically evaluated actions. The availability of degree terms in the former case seems to indicate the presence of many criteria used in evaluation; an all-or- nothing choice, implied by the use of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, suggests focusing on only one quantum quality.12 But fine-grainedness is not only a property of particular aretaic terms, the entire aretaic vocabulary is infinitely richer and allows us to draw much finer distinctions in act-evaluations than the deontic vocabulary. **For example**, by saying that something is praiseworthy we imply that it deserves approval or favor: we assess it higher when we say that it is admirable, since then it should be also respected and honored. The meaning of the word ‘praiseworthy’ can be quite well conveyed by saying, that it is something that ought to be done, or that it is the right (in Ross’s understanding of ‘right’) thing to do: yet expressing the word ‘admirable’ in deontic vocabulary seems just impossible. From what has been said so far one can derive an encouraging conclusion for the advocates of attractive ethics. Sheer richness and fine-grainedness of aretaic vocabulary seems to be a good reason for believing that all that can be said in deontic terms can be equally well expressed in aretaic terms. This is not to say, however, that we can produce a translation manual which would provide us with a general method of expressing deontic notions in terms of aretaic ones for all possible cases. In particular, it does not seem possible, as we hope to have shown, to substitute ‘good’ for ‘right’ or ‘deplorable’ for ‘wrong’. The relation between the aretaic and the deontic seems to be somewhat similar to the relation between the physical and the mental in the mind-body problem. We can claim that deontic is supervenient on the aretaic without committing ourselves to the idea of complete definitional reduction. In other words, we may allow for token identity (each particular action can have an aretaic description that perfectly matches the deontic one) and deny the possibility of type identity (that there is aretaic sentence true of all and only the actions having some deontic property). If this analogy is correct then the idea of definitional reduction of the deontic to the aretaic**, and in particular, Stocker’s identification** of rightness and goodness, is doomed. But we can still pursue a more modest goal. If our task is just to substitute every particular deontic evaluation with an aretaic one, there are no logical reasons that would make it impossible **(it would not work, of course, in the opposite direction).** From that perspective, attractive ethical theories seem to be much better off than the imperative ones.

*deont:* the Aretaic is a prior question – it’s a question of who you are not what you do.

2) Rules are indeterminate since any new application of a rule could be consistent with infinitely many rules that explained all past actions taken by a supposed rule-follower, and there is no basis by which someone can claim a distinct application of a rule is any more consistent with one rule rather than another. For example, if I add two numbers I’ve never added before, like 50 and 49, and get 99, I would have no logical basis from my past math operations to refute a skeptic who tells me the answer is actually 5, since my past usage of the addition rule might have been the “quaddition” rule or “quounting” instead of counting. These problems apply throughout language – any finite set of operations are consistent with an infinite initial group of rules – which means our only option is relying on communities as determining the content of heuristic “rules,” which leads us to a virtue rather than rule-based ethic.

*deont:*

a) no rules could be known to be applied in a given situation – for example any action could accord with the categorical imperative because you might deem yourself the exception and all previous applications were in the schmategorical imperative.

b) if one gives rules to oneself one is both legislature and judge and can interpret any self-given rule to accord with any action. Only publicly grounded rules are meaningful. you also interpret and judge in every instance whether or not it was consistent. You can define universalizing however you want. There wouldn’t be any reason to say it’s worse or better to follow a particular rule.

*contracts:*

1) We can only have contract if we have a communal system of language to interpret them and make them so the AC framework is the internal link.

2) Our communal system of language does not equate contacts with morality because we all ask for instance if this contract is moral.

3) Gauthier does not say we need to be absolutely equal in order to form moral contracts – for instance me and my opponent are unequal in intelligence nevertheless we can still hash out reasonable expectations in the debate space – Gauthier is establishing a bright line of such massive inequality (like a human to a horse) that is so extensive that we could not reason with one another, not random inequality.

3) only virtue paradigms can both provide principles that can extend in application and be socially bounded. **MAYO:[[21]](#footnote-21)** No doubt the fundamental moral question is just ‘What ought I to do?’ And according to the philosophy of moral principles, the answer (which must be an imperative ‘Do this’) must be derived from a conjunction of premisses consisting (in the simplest case) firstly of a rule, or universal imperative, enjoining (or forbidding) all actions of a certain type in situations of a certain type, and, secondly, a statement to the effect that this is a situation of that type, falling under that rule. In practice the emphasis may be on supplying only one of these premisses, the other being assumed or taken for granted: one may answer the question ‘What ought I to do?’ either by quoting a rule which I am to adopt, or by showing that my case is legislated for by a rule which I do adopt. To take a previous example of moral per plexity,1 if I am in doubt whether to tell the truth about his condition to a dying man, my doubt may be resolved by showing that the case comes under a rule about the avoidance of unnecessary suffering, which I am assumed to accept. But if the case is without precedent in my moral career, my problem may be soluble only by adopting a new principle about what I am to do now and in the future about cases of this kind. This second possibility offers a connection with moral ideals. Suppose my perplexity is not merely an unprecedented situation which I could cope with by adopting a new rule. Suppose the new rule is thoroughly inconsistent with my existing moral code. This may happen, for instance, if the moral code is one to which I only pay lip-service; if (in the language of IX , 7) its ; authority is not yet internalised, or if it has ceased to be so; it is i ready for rejection, but its final rejection awaits a moral crisis such as we are assuming to occur. What I now need is not a rule for deciding how to act in this situation and others of its kind. I need a whole set of rules, a complete morality, new principles to live by. Now according to the philosophy of moral character, there is another way of answering the fundamental question **‘What ; ought I to do?’** Instead of quoting a rule, we quote a quality of ' character, a virtue: we say ‘Be brave’, or ‘Be patient’ or ‘Be lenient’. We may even say ‘Be a man’: if I am in doubt, say, whether to take a risk, and someone says ‘Be a man’, meaning a morally sound man, in this case a man of sufficient courage. (Compare the very different ideal invoked in ‘Be a gentleman’. I shall not discuss whether this is a moral ideal.) Here, too, we have the extreme cases, where a man’s moral perplexity extends not merely to a particular situation but to his whole way of living. And now the question ‘What ought I to do?**’** turns into the question ‘What ought I to be?’ — as, indeed, it was treated in the first place. (‘Be brave.’) It is answered, not by quoting a rule **or a set of rules,** but **by** describing a quality of character or a type of person. And here the ethics of character gains a practical simplicity which offsets the greater logical simplicity of the ethics of principles. We do not have to give a list of characteristics or virtues, as we might list a set of principles. We can give a unity to our answer. Of course we can in theory give a unity to our principles: this is implied by speaking of a set of principles. But if such a set is to be a system and not a mere aggregate, the unity we are looking for is a logical one, namely the possibility that some principles are deducible from others, and ultimately from one. But the attempt to construct a deductive moral system is notoriously difficult, and in any case ill-founded. Why should we expect that all rules of conduct should be ultimately reducible to a few? 9. Saints and Heroes But when we are asked ‘What shall I be?’ we can readily give a unity to **our answer**, though not a logical unity. It is the unity of character. A person’s character is not merely a list of dispositions; it has the organic unity of something that is more than the sum of its parts. **And** We can say**, in answer to our morally perplexed questioner, not only ‘Be this’ and ‘Be that’, but also ‘**Be like So-and-So’ **— where So-and-So is either an ideal type of character, or else an actual person taken as representative of the ideal, an exemplar.** Examples of the first are Plato’s ‘just man’ **in the Republic; Aristotle’s man of practical wisdom, in the Nicomachean Ethics;** Augustine’s citizen of the City of God; the good Communist**; the American way of life (which is a co lective expression for a type of character). Examples of the second kind, the exemplar, are** Socrates,Christ, Buddha, St. Francis**, the heroes of epic writers and of novelists. Indeed the idea of the Hero, as well as the idea of the Saint, are very much the expression of this attitude to morality. Heroes and saints are not merely people who did things. They are people whom we are expected, and expect ourselves, to imitate. And** imitating them means not merely doing what they did; it means being like them. Their status is not in the least like that of legislators whose laws we admire; for the character of a legislator is irrelevant to our judgment about his legislation. **The heroes and saints did not merely give us principles to live by (though some of them did that as well): they gave us examples to follow.**

*deont:* Social interpretation is not enough to grasp deontic rules, because I cannot be made aware of socially defined rules to legislate action in all moral contexts.

AT DEONT interaction:

We cannot understand the concept of human freedom except within a paradigm of human flourishing. **KELLER:[[22]](#footnote-22)** Christianity is supposedly a limit to personal growth and potential because it constrains our freedom to choose our own beliefs and practices. Immanuel Kant defined an enlightened human being as one who trusts in his or her own power of thinking, rather than in authority or tradition.27 This resistance to authority in moral matters is now a deep current in our culture. Freedom to determine our own moral standards is considered a necessity for being fully human. This oversimplifies, however. Freedom cannot be defined in strictly negative terms, as the absence of confinement and constraint. In fact, in many cases, confinement and constraint is actually a means to liberation. If you have musical aptitude, you may give yourself to practice, practice, practice the piano for years. This is a restriction, a limit on your freedom. There are many other things you won’t be able to do with the time you invest in practicing. If you have the talent, however, the discipline and limitation will unleash your ability that would otherwise go untapped. What have you done? You’ve deliberately lost your freedom to engage in some things in order to release yourself to a richer kind of freedom to accomplish other things. This does not mean that restriction, discipline, and constraint are intrinsically, automatically liberating. For example, a five-foot-four, 125-pound young adult male should not set his heart on becoming an NFL lineman. All the discipline and effort in the world will only frustrate and crush him (literally). He is banging his head against a physical reality—he simply does not have the potential. In our society many people have worked extremely hard to pursue careers that pay well rather than fit their talents and interests. Such careers are straitjackets that in the long run stifle and dehumanize us. Disciplines and constraints, then, liberate us only when they fit with the reality of our nature and capacities. A fish, because it absorbs oxygen from water rather than air, is only free if it is restricted and limited to water. If we put it out on the grass, its freedom to move and even live is not enhanced, but destroyed. The fish dies if we do not honor the reality of its nature. In many areas of life, freedom is not so much the absence of restrictions as finding the right ones, the liberating restrictions. Those that fit with the reality of our nature and the world produce greater power and scope for our abilities and a deeper joy and fulfillment. Experimentation, risk, and making mistakes bring growth only if, over time, they show us our limits as well as our abilities. If we only grow intellectually, vocationally, and physically through judicious constraints—why would it not also be true for spiritual and moral growth? Instead of insisting on freedom to create spiritual reality, shouldn’t we be seeking to discover it and disciplining ourselves to live according to it? The popular concept—that we should each determine our own morality—is based on the belief that the spiritual realm is nothing at all like the rest of the world. Does anyone really believe that? For many years after each of the morning and evening Sunday services I remained in the auditorium for another hour to field questions.

more reasons to prefer fwk:

1. Virtue ethics is the only way to bridge the ought-ought gap because it recognizes that individuals can make mistakes and then improve on them. **MAYO[[23]](#footnote-23):** Imitation can be amore or less successful. And this suggests another defect of the ethics of principles. It has no room for ideals, except the ideal of a perfect set of principles (which, as a matter of fact, is intelligible only in terms of an ideal character or way of life), and the ideal of perfect conscientiousness (which is itself a character-trait). This results, of course, from the “black-or-white” nature of moral verdicts based on rules. There are no degrees by which we approach or recede from the attainment of a certain quality or virtue; if there were not, the word “ideal” would have no meaning. Heroes and saints are not people whom we try to be just like, since we know that it’s impossible. It is precisely because it is impossible for ordinary human beings to achieve the same quality as the saints, and in the same degree, that we do set them apart from the rest of humanity. It is enough if we try to be a little like them.

2. Any ethical reasoning will require ethics to be explicatory. **READER[[24]](#footnote-24):** What is the alternative? To understand ethics in its own terms. This deprives us of explanatory naturalism. We can't without error expect to understand ethics in any terms but ethical. This has seemed to many philosophers to be unduly restrictive, and to threaten relativism.8 But in fact it does not lead to these difficulties ? or, more accurately, it doesn't exac erbate them. The problem of displaying the rationality of ethics in a com pelling way is real. But it is also general. It is the same as the problem of displaying the rationality of all the other things we do: playing games, conducting scientific enquiry, writing philosophy papers. We might be able to make connections between activities using an analogy with another game, say, to illuminate the game of chess for someone. But all we will ever be able to lay our hands on in the activity of explaining, is more of the same: parts of our life. The idea of our being able to use 'the world as it is in itself to explain any of our activities is practically contradictory. And the idea that rationality supernature, rather than first nature can be used to explain ethics in this way, involves a similar error. The way we think acquire beliefs, deliberate, justify ourselves is also part of our life. It is as 'fundamental' in that life as ethics is, but no more so, no more knowable 'in itself, as Aristotle, in the grip of a similar error to our own, would have put it, than it is 'to us', here and now, living as we live. So explanatory accounts of ethics, whether they invoke first-nature or super natural reason, are mistaken. Explicatory naturalism is as far as we can go. And as far as we need to go.

3. theory reasons to prefer standard: Most people use virtue ethics because it is the most intuitional. We are raised on virtues; nobody teaches their kids deontology, but they teach them simple virtues like being honest and respectful. Other theories cant account for how we reach moral decisions and how we learn.

4.Only naturalism solves for infinite regress. **MACINTYRE[[25]](#footnote-25):** An agent can only justify a particular judgment by referring to some universal rule from which it may be logically derived, and can only justify that rule in turn by deriving it from some more general rule or principle; but on this view since every chain of reasoning must be finite, such a process of justificatory reasoning must always terminate with the assertion of some rule or principle for which no further reason can be given. Each individual implicitly or explicitly has to adopt his or her own first principles on the basis of such a choice. The utterance of any universal principle is in the end an expression of the preferences of an individual will and for that will its principles have and can have only such authority as it chooses to confer upon them by adopting them. However, that does not mean morality in and of its self cannot exist, therefore, I present the following burden analysis an individual will and can have only such authority as [one] chooses to confer upon [it].

AT emulation bad:

It’s not do what they would do, but be as they are. Emulate the method by which they make moral decision. We can say be like Jesus but that’s not to say we should be son of god it just means we need to value compassion and things they valued. We don’t need to be freedom fighters like Gandhi to value nonviolence and compassion. **MAYO[[26]](#footnote-26):** Imitation can be amore or less successful. And this suggests another defect of the **ethics of principles**. It **has no room for ideals, except** the ideal **of a perfect set of principles** (**which**, as a matter of fact, **is intelligible only in terms of an ideal character** or way of life), **and** the ideal of perfect conscientiousness (which is itself a character-trait). **This results,** of course, **from the “black-or-white” nature of** moral verdicts based on **rules. There are no degrees** by which we approach or recede **from the attainment of a certain quality or virtue;** if there were not, the word “ideal” would have no meaning. **Heroes and saints are not people whom we try to be just like, since we know that it’s impossible. It is** precisely **because it is impossible** for ordinary human beings to achieve the same quality as the saints, and in the same degree, **that we** do **set them apart from the rest of humanity. It is enough if we try to be a little like them.**

unemployment interaction:

1) Unemployment is not responsive – it’s a question of altering the relationship between workers and employer [that’s Rogers]. We cannot use an unjust contract for the purposes of a good end, like to ensure more people maintain their jobs. If I buy a book and then do not pay, I cannot say I don’t need to pay because I should just donate the money to charity instead. The same reason you cannot hire workers to steal from others.

2) The secnd contention says if you work, then you need to be paid because your work promotes the goods of society and you should share in that good. It it does not say that just generically people should be given good, but that they should share in those goods they produce through fair renumeration.

AT self-love = egoism:

This is not self-love that tries to secure material advantage but to have the proper love for development and exercise of capabilities. The example of friendship proves. **ARISTOTLE[[27]](#footnote-27):** There is also a puzzle about whether a person should love himself most or someone else. For people admonish those who like themselves most, calling them “self-lovers,” on the supposition that this is actually something shameful. It seems too that a base person does all his actions for the sake of him[them]self, and the more depraved he is the more he does so—people complain, therefore, that he “does nothing from himself.” A decent person, by contrast, seems to act because of what is noble, and the better he is the more he does so, and for the sake of a friend, disregarding his own interests. With these accounts, however, our results clash, which is not surprising. For the results say that we should love most the one who is most a friend, and the one who is most a friend is the one who wishes good things to the person he wishes them to for that person’s own sake, even if no one will know. But these features are found most in a person’s relations to [her]himself, as of course are all the others by which a friend is defined. For, as we said, it is from oneself that all the features fitted to friendship also extend to others. All the proverbs are of one mind about this as well—for example, “one soul,” and “what friends have they have in common,” and “equality is friendship,” and “knee is closer than shin.” For all these things are found most in a person’s relations to himself. For [s]he is a friend to him[her]self most of all, and should, then, love him[her]self most. It is reasonable to be puzzled, then, as to which side we should follow, since both carry conviction. Now presumably in cases like these we need to draw distinctions in connection with the arguments and determine to what extent and in what ways they grasp the truth. If, then, we were to find out what those on each side mean by “self-love,” perhaps that would be clear. Now those who reduce it to a term of reproach call “self-lovers” those who allocate to themselves the greater share in money, honors, and bodily pleasures. For these are the things ordinary people desire and take seriously, on the supposition that they are the best goods—which is why they are fought about. Those people, then, who are greedy where these things are concerned gratify their appetites and their feelings and the nonrational part of the |20| soul generally. And ordinary people are like this, which is why the term has come about, deriving from the most ordinary case, which really is a base one. Those who are self-lovers in this way, then, are justly objects of reproach. That it is those who allocate goods of this sort to themselves that most people are used to calling “self-lovers” is clear enough. For if someone were always taking more seriously than anything else the doing of just actions or temperate ones or whatever else might be in accord with the virtues, and in general were always keeping for himself what was noble, no one would call this person a “self-lover” or blame him. A person of this sort, though, would seem to be more of a self-lover. At any rate, he allocates to himself the good things that are noblest and the ones that are best of all and gratifies the element in himself that has most control, obeying it in everything. But just as a city too or any other complex system, seems to be most of all its most controlling part, so also does a human being. A person is most of all a self-lover, then, who likes this part and gratifies this part. Also, a person is called “self-controlled” or “lacking in self-control” depending on whether or not his understanding is in control, on the supposition that this is what each person is, and it is actions involving reason that people seem most of all to do themselves and to do voluntarily. So it is clear enough that this part is what each person is or is most of all and that a decent person likes this part most. That is why a decent person is most of all a self-lover, but of a different form than the one that is reproached and differing from it as much as living in accord with reason does from living in accord with feeling and as much as desiring what is noble does from desiring what seems advantageous.

AT actor specificity:

**AT actor specificity arguments:**

We elect politicians based on how good we think they are as people – seems to underlie democracy.

Your weighing begs the question – policymakers must have the right orientation towards the good if they are to understand the good policy. **ARISTOTLE[[28]](#footnote-28):** Let us, then, resume our account. Since every sort of knowledge and every deliberate choice reaches after some good, let us say what it is |15| politics seeks—that is, what the topmost of all the good things doable in action is. About its name, most people are pretty much agreed, since both ordinary people and sophisticated ones say it is “happiness” and suppose that living well and doing well are the same as being happy.29 Concerning happiness, however, and what |20| it is, they are in dispute, and ordinary people do not give the same answer as wise ones. For ordinary people think it is one of the plainly evident things, such as pleasure or wealth or honor—some taking it to be one thing, others another. And often the same person thinks it is different things, since when he gets a disease, it is health, whereas when he is poor, it is wealth. But when these people are conscious of their own ignorance |25| they are wonder-struck by those who proclaim some great thing that is over their heads. And some people did used to think that, beyond these many good things, there is another intrinsically good one that causes all of them to be good.30 Now it is presumably quite pointless to inquire into all these beliefs, and enough to inquire into those that are most prevalent or that seem to have some argument for them.31 We must not let it escape our notice, however, |30| that arguments leading from starting-points and arguments leading to starting-points are different.32 For Plato too was rightly puzzled about this and would inquire whether the route was leading from starting-points or to starting-points—as, in a stadium racecourse, that of the athletes may lead away from the starting-point toward the boundary or in the reverse direction. |1095b1| We must indeed start from things that are knowable. But things are knowable in two ways, since some are knowable to us, some unconditionally.33 So presumably we should start from things knowable to us. That is why we must be nobly brought up if, where noble things, just things, and the topics of politics as a whole are concerned, |5| we are to be an adequate audience.34 For the starting-point is the fact that something is so, and, if this is sufficiently evident, we do not also need the explanation of why it is so.35 A nobly brought up person, then, either has the starting-points or can easily get hold of them. And as for someone who neither has nor can get hold of them, he should listen to Hesiod:

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3. using the example of Gaius and Titius as interlocutors who attempt to find an alternative basis for morality. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Laws: 653. Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 10 & 11 translated by R.G. Bury. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1967 & 1968. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
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6. Brishen Rogers [Assistant Professor of Law, Temple University James E. Beasley School of Law]. “Justice at Work: Minimum Wage Laws and Social Equality.” Texas Law Review, Vol. 92. April 2014. MT recut from MZ [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. This was bracketed in by Rogers in the original article not by me. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. John Rawls [the famous one] *A Theory of Justice*, Revised Edition. Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts pages 1971. 386-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. John Rawls [the famous one] *A Theory of Justice*, Revised Edition. Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts pages 1971. 155-6 [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
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12. Oren M, pf public affairs and administration @ Metropolitan College of New York, formerly pf @ Bard, “The Living Wage: Realizing the Republican Ideal” Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Jul., 2003), pp. 171-196. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
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14. LABOREM EXERCENS. 1981. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. LABOREM EXERCENS. 1981. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. 2004 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. [ibid] [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. [ibid] [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Brishen Rogers [Assistant Professor of Law, Temple University James E. Beasley School of Law]. “Justice at Work: Minimum Wage Laws and Social Equality.” Texas Law Review, Vol. 92. April 2014. MT recut from MZ [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
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26. [ibid] [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Translated by C.D.C. Reeve in 2014. Date Written is Unknown. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. [ibid] [↑](#footnote-ref-28)